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ments of the day. It is really not sufficient, and it serves only the most limited purpose, to contrive, as Miss Hotblack does, to make Chatham explain his conduct in his own words. It would be better, in addition, to attempt to value his views by resetting them in the arena of public debate from which they have been isolated. Had Miss Hotblack only cared to go further afield and to master, for example, the collections of pamphlets upon the Seven Years War alone, her study of Pitt's trading policy would have appeared less contracted. A few, even, of the eighty-odd pamphlets on the Canada-Guadaloupe controversy would have shown that in such a dispute the routine information of a government department does not compare for interest with the lively solicitude given the question in unofficial discussion. Also, more specifically, the same pamphlets would have explained the actual issue in the choice between Guadaloupe and Canada—an alternative which Miss Hotblack, relying too closely perhaps upon departmental letters, seems strangely to misinterpret; partly, it is to be feared, from a rather insecure understanding of the geography and economic exploitation of Canada before the cession. However, within the self-imposed limitations of this brief piece of research Miss Hotblack has sought out some very telling illustrative material, which elucidates Chatham's mercantilism, and throws the subject into clear outline.

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The Origins of the Triple Alliance. By ARCHIBALD CARY COOLIDGE. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1917. Pp. vi, 236.)

Although in Russia the Bolsheviki appear ready to open to all mankind the diplomatic *arcana* of the old régime, it will probably be many a day before Prussia, Austria, and Italy will allow historians free access to the secret records of their diplomatic history between 1866 and 1882. Until that day comes the historian must be content to catch at the clues in inspired newspaper articles, in hints, discreet and indiscreet, which statesmen drop in their reminiscences for the enlightenment or befogging of posterity, and in stories current in the legations and chancelleries of Europe. Professor Coolidge has caught with unusual success at all these clues available and has weighed their value with great acumen and common sense. He has wisely forborne to

burden the reader with long notes on controversial points, but he has given the clearest, simplest, and most convincing narrative in English, of the way in which Bismarck sought to make secure from without the new German Empire which he had founded.

Bismarck's chief source of anxiety immediately after the Franco-Prussian War was the possibility of French schemes of *revanche*. To protect Germany from this he skillfully pursued a tortuous policy which had as its successful purpose the diplomatic isolation of the new French Republic. In this he was aided by the so-called League of the Three Emperors—a combination of the same three great powers which had brought about the First Partition of Poland just one hundred years earlier. Later, in 1879, owing to justifiable Russian resentment over the outcome of the Congress of Berlin, Bismarck felt it necessary to insure the German Empire on her Eastern frontier also—hence the Dual Alliance with Austria. It is worth noting that when he went to Vienna in September, 1879, to negotiate with Andrassy, he pretended to wish that the treaty of alliance between the two Germanic empires should be a general treaty and should be made a part of the constitution of both states. Andrassy, however, refused both points: a general treaty might antagonize France, with whom Austria had no quarrel; and the inclusion of the treaty as a constitutional document would recall in a measure the German Confederation which had been ruptured by the War of 1866. So Bismarck yielded, and the Dual Alliance, as signed, looked primarily eastward: "Should one of the two Empires be attacked by Russia, the High Contracting Parties are bound to come to the assistance one of the other with the whole war strength of their Empires" (Art. I). If one were attacked by another power—by which Bismarck of course meant France—the other contracting party bound itself "to observe at least a benevolent neutral attitude" (Art. II). In the Triple Alliance three years later there appears this same ominous phrase, "benevolent neutrality"—itself a contradiction in terms—the full significance of which was not apparent until August 2, 1914, when Germany demanded that Belgium maintain an attitude of "friendly neutrality" toward herself.

Aside from its clearness and interest, the book is noteworthy for its considerable attention to Russian and Balkan influences, for its evaluation of the personal influence of rulers and statesmen, and for its just estimate of Bismarck.

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